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Marriage, Money, Notice, and Presumptions 
Roger Bernhardt 
In re Marriage of Brooks 
When I finished reading In re Marriage of Brooks (reported at p 53), I had a lot of questions 
about it but no answers, which led me to write thismythical memo to a junior associate. Despite 
the absence of conclusions, I hope readers can still find it somewhat useful as a checklist of 
issues to worry about in this confusing field. See also my column Midcourse Corrections: Love 
Your Husband But Don’t Lend Him Any Money, 26 CEB RPLR 40 (Jan. 2003).—RB 
I want you to prepare me for an interview I am having tomorrow with an old client, Michael 
Brock, to discuss problems he is having with his house. According to what Michael told me on 
the phone today, it seems that he and his wife, Anita, purchased a house a few years ago, taking 
title in her name alone, based on the advice of their loan broker, even though Michael’s money 
was the source of the downpayment. Michael also told me that they had defaulted on their 
mortgage and that his wife apparently then sold the house, under one of those home equity sales 
contracts for cash. Anita seems to have vanished with the money, and Executory Cuticle, the 
purchaser, has told Michael that he has to move out. I want a memo from you on the issues 
involved. 
Potential Claims 
First, let’s start with what kinds of claims Michael might have against Anita personally. (I 
know that his fight is with Executory Cuticle rather than against Anita, but if they can be held to 
take subject to Michael’s claims against her, as I will have you analyze below, that makes it 
worth considering what sorts of claims he does have against her.) Michael said that he believed 
that the house was community property because they were married, but since the form of title 
presumption from the deed overcomes the general community property presumption from the 
marriage, I wonder: Is that the best position for him to take? Can Michael make a better resulting 
trust or constructive trust claim to the entire title based on the fact that his separate funds were 
used to acquire a property that was taken under a different name? True, Michael and Anita were 
married, but since the house was held in her name as her separate property rather than as 
community property, doesn’t that make a trust argument easier to assert? 
If you don’t think we would get anywhere arguing that the house is really Michael’s rather 
than Anita’s, how about arguing that it belongs to b th of them, on the ground that those 
acquisition funds were community assets? Michael said that the money came from his earnings; 
if those were earnings generated during the marriage, they were community funds. Doesn’t the 
community acquire an interest in separate property of a spouse as it pays for it? Even if it is not 
treated as an investment by the community, can it be argued that it should be treated as a loan by 
the community to the sole owning spouse, generating a ri ht of reimbursement? Could Michael 
testify (since Anita may not be around to contradict him) that he intended to lend Anita the 
money for her to buy the house in her own name? 
Constructive and Inquiry Notice 
Our adversary is Executory Cuticle rather than Anita, but some of our claims may also be 
effective against Executory if we can show that it is not a bona fide purchaser. Can Executory 
Cuticle be charged with notice, since Michael was living in the house (and apparently Anita was 
not) at the time that Executory’s agent visited andoffered to purchase it? Since there is a general 
duty to inquire of any person in possession as to the nature of his possession, does that mean that 
Executory’s agent should have asked Michael what he was doing there, rather than asking Anita 
who Michael was? Will that make Michael’s simple testimony that he was in the room at the 
time sufficient, or should he also be prepared to testify that if he had been asked he would have 
said that he was married to Anita? Should he add that he would have also revealed that all of the 
money came from him, even if he was asked only about his presence? Should he be prepared to 
go even further and say that he would have told Executory’s agent that the money was definitely 
not a gift, but rather a loan to Anita or an investment in the house? Does Fam C §1102(c), which 
creates a presumption of validity for a deed of community property executed by only one spouse 
when the purchaser took it “in good faith and without knowledge of the marriage relation,” 
impose any additional duty to inquire when a man is i the house? 
The Evidence Code Presumption 
I assume that Executory Cuticle (and Anita) will attempt to hide behind the presumption of 
Evid C §662 that legal title is presumed to be beneficial title and the fact that legal title was in 
Anita’s name alone. I know that simply showing that Anita was married to Michael is not 
enough to overcome that presumption. On the other hand, the presumption is not conclusive—
the statute says it can be rebutted by clear and covincing evidence. So can we find any? 
First, tell me what it would take to overcome the pr sumption in the dissolution action itself. 
Michael cannot testify that he never knew that Anita’s name alone was on the deed, but is it 
enough if he says that he didn’t know that the deed described her as a single person? Would it be 
sufficient if he testified that he felt unduly pressured to let Anita’s name be the only one on title 
so that she wouldn’t be angry with him? 
If more is needed, how do we show a “contrary agreement or understanding,” which the cases 
seem to require for rebuttal? (See, .g., Marriage of Rives (1982) 130 CA3d 138, 162, 181 CR 
572; Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 CA4th 277, 292, 39 CR2d 673.) If Michael testified that he 
and Anita had “agreed” that he had some interest in he house, must his testimony be 
corroborated? By whom? Anita? Must Michael produce a document to that effect, or can he give 
clear and convincing testimony about an oral agreement? 
Since the judicial requirement adds “understanding” as an alternative to “agreement,” can 
Michael bring himself under that as a substitute standard by testifying that he always 
“understood” the house to belong to both of them? Must he testify that Anita also had that 
understanding? Can he testify to that conclusion without having to quote her? If Anita cannot be 
found, is our case harder or easier? Can a third paty corroborate Michael about Anita’s 
understanding? 
Second, assuming we can produce evidence that would work against Anita, will it also be 
effective against Executory Cuticle? Are they more p otected by Evid C §662 than Anita is, or 
does the fact that they can be charged with constructive inquiry notice bring them back down to 
her level? I need to know how the clear and convincing standard operates against an inquiry 
notice principle. Does Michael have to: 
• Clearly and convincingly demonstrate that he had an understanding or agreement with Anita; and 
• Clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Executory knew of it? 
If a court accepts the earlier arguments we made that Michael’s possession should have caused 
Executory to inquire of him, will it be enough to show that those are the responses Michael 
would have given to Executory’s questions, or do we still have to show (to Executory or to a 
judge) that he was clear and convincing? (I think I am asking whether actual knowledge or 
constructive notice by a grantee of a claim reduces th  need of the claimant to prove the validity 
of that claim by clear and convincing evidence.) 
The client is coming in tomorrow at 10 a.m. and, of c urse, I will want to study your memo 
before then. That gives you plenty of time, since it is now only 4 p.m. 
Another Good Book for New Lawyers 
A Practical Guide To Commercial Real Estate Transactions, by Gregory M. Stein, Mortimer 
P. Fisher, Jr., and Marjorie P. Fisher (ABA, 2d ed., 2008), describes itself as intended for the 
new associate whose first assignment might be to draft representations and warranties overnight 
for a supervising partner too busy to explain anythi g to him and his next-door associate unable 
to help since she is away reviewing leases in Detroit. This book declares that it is designed to 
help the victim navigate a way through that predicament, and I think it does. Indeed, it does 
considerably more than that. It is denser than any si gle volume hornbook and more than makes 
up in practical information for what it lacks in citations (which, always being of a national sort, 
rarely do local attorneys much good). 
The book covers real estate sales, loans, and closings (not leasing). The text is thorough and I 
did not find any issue uncovered. What was most admirable was the combination of doctrinal 
text with practical advice in the sections, so that abstract rules were not just thrown at readers, 
but connected up with suggestions and cautions. That style, especially when combined with 
some very extensive forms, makes this book valuable not only for the new member of the firm 
but for the older ones as well. Many of the boxed “comments” look more like afterthoughts, but 
that does not make them any less useful. 




Husband’s community property claim failed because he had agreed that property be held 
solely in wife’s name. 
In re Marriage of Brooks (2008) 169 CA4th 176, 86 CR3d 624 
A few years after their marriage in 1997, Michael Brooks and Annikkawa Robinson purchased 
a home. Although Robinson contributed no funds to the downpayment, Brooks agreed that the 
title to the home be held solely in the name of “Annikkawa A. Robinson, a Single Woman,” to 
facilitate financing the purchase, on the advice of their real estate agent. Although the two deeds 
of trust were in the name of and executed by Annikkawa, Michael made the payments on the 
loans they secured. In February 2005, Annikkawa and Michael separated; Annikkawa moved 
out; and Michael and their son remained in the home, which was in foreclosure. In April 2005, 
Annikkawa sold the home to Executive Capital Group (ECG), netting $41,851.03 after deducting 
expenses and payoff of the loans. In January 2006, Michael brought claims, alleging his 
community property interest, against ECG in the marital dissolution case. The trial court 
bifurcated the claims against ECG from the family law proceedings, held a bench trial, and 
awarded the property to ECG as a bona fide purchaser, with title free of any unknown 
community property claim. 
The court of appeal affirmed. The court of appeal applied the “form of title” presumption, that 
the owner of legal title is presumed to be the owner of full beneficial title, rebuttable only by 
clear and convincing proof. Evid C §662. The act of specifying Annikkawa’s ownership in the 
original title removed the property from the more gneral community property presumption. 
Michael was unable to present any evidence of an agreement or understanding with Annikkawa 
that the home was other than her separate property. T acing the source of funds for the 
downpayment is not sufficient to overcome the form of title presumption. Marriage of Lucas 
(1980) 27 C3d 808, 813, 166 CR 853. Moreover, the case simply contained no facts relating to 
transmutation or property held jointly. Thus, Michael’s claims failed. 
 
